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 SYMPOSIUM: THE NOTION OF INFINITY.
 PROFESSOR J. N. FINDLAY. DR. C. LEWY.
 PROFESSOR S. K6RNER.
 I.-By J. N. FINDLAY.
 I AM about to introduce a symposium on infinity. I
 do so, not because I can claim any special intimacy with
 the infinite, nor yet because I feel myself specially competent
 to unravel its intricacies, but because I think it all-important
 that a notion so fundamental should be rescued from
 the grip of the experts, and should be brought back into
 general circulation. It is a notion so common and so
 clear as to lie behind practically every use of the ordinary
 phrases " and so on " or " and so forth," but it is none the
 less capable of giving rise to vertiginous bewilderments,
 which may lead, on the one hand, to the mystical multipli-
 cation of contradictions, as also, on the other hand, to that
 voluntary curtailment of our talk and thought on certain
 matters, which is as ruinous to our ordered thinking.
 A notion which is at once so tantalising and so ordinary
 plainly deserves the perpetual notice of philosophers.
 Throughout the history of human reflection the fogs of an
 interesting, and often interested obscurity have surrounded
 the infinite ; they were dispersed for a brief period by the
 sense-making genius of Cantor, but have since gathered
 about it with an added, because more wilful, impenetrability.
 In the growing illiteracy of our time, when the lamp of
 memory barely sheds its beams beyond the past two decades,
 and the controversies or discoveries of 1890 or 1910 have
 been allowed to become as stale and as irrelevant as those
 of Anselm or Xenocrates, it is well that someone should at
 times seek to recapture and to revivify some of the positive
 illuminations of the past. It is no doubt regrettable that
 my own personal grasp of mathematical formulations
 should so often halt and stumble; I pursue symbolic
 intricacy in the way of duty, my taste in philosophy
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 being for the gnomically simple. If I make mistakes,
 there will, however, be many to correct me, and I may
 hope, also, that, here as elsewhere, sheer myopia and
 symbolic clumsiness, may at times prove the mother of
 philosophical invention. I must attempt, at any rate, to
 do what others, better qualified than myself, have so
 entirely neglected ; it is better that someone should discuss
 this topic with the freedom of philosophy, than that
 all talk about it should be allowed to flow along those
 technical channels which, whatever else they may do, never
 enrich our philosophical understanding.
 I shall divide my treatment of infinity into two sections.
 In the first I shall skim briefly over the historical terrain
 of western thought about the infinite, so that it may be
 plain where I propose to come down in this field, and
 precisely what drifts of thought I intend to reinforce or to
 combat. In the second part I shall let you have a few of
 my own personal intuitions on the matter, backed up with
 an amplifying commentary, which will try to show how
 our thought about the infinite may be fitted into the general
 pattern of our thought about number.
 I begin, therefore, with my historical perspective, fore-
 shortened as to its remoter phases, of western thought
 about the infinite. The notion of something so com-
 prehensive (in some respect or another) as to be at least
 equal to anything we can build up in thought, either by
 the putting together of parts, or the successive running
 through of elements or aspects, and which is yet not such
 as to be contained or exhausted in such constructions or
 resumptions, is a notion of no peculiar difficulty or obscurity,
 and it is also one that made an early appearance in
 the clear thought of the lonians. Here we have success-
 ively brought before us, as the " nature " of the things
 in our world, a number of august, embracing media,
 sometimes identified with the homely substances of
 everyday experience, and sometimes hedged about with
 negations, which are all infinite in extent, and which are
 also such that out of their bosom an infinity of worlds can
 be successively or simultaneously generated. There is
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 nothing, in such a straightforward picture, to suggest that
 the infinite is itself in some manner unexhausted or incom-
 plete, or engaged in some perpetual, restless process of
 trying to run through, or to sum up, the totality of its parts
 and phases ; it is all there, in majestic, fully-realised
 plenitude and repose, and it is only we, or the hurrying
 series of worlds of which we form a part, who are trying
 vainly to exhaust whatever may be in it. There is also
 nothing, in such a straightforward picture, which demands
 that the infinite should itself be in any way exhaustive ;
 the worlds which arise out of its bosom are themselves infinite
 in number, yet there remains always an infinitude of other
 stuff around them, and outside of them.
 What we have called a straightforward picture of the
 infinite is not, however, one that western thought has
 found easy to hold. While it may not involve anything
 intrinsically difficult, and while the only real questions
 connected with it may be those concerning its precise
 implications and applications, it has none the less always
 seemed to abound in contradictions, and to render
 absurd and self-contradictory any idea in which it could be
 shown to be present. To speak of it seems to involve
 exhausting the inexhaustible, than which nothing more
 absurd could be conceivable; it also gives difficulty in
 that, without being accessible to our imagination, it lacks
 the happy circumscribability which would render it accept-
 able to our thought. Hence there has arisen, at an early
 stage of thinking, a tradition which has tried to substitute
 for the infinite what we may call the variable finite, the
 finite which can always be pushed a stage further, without
 ever achieving all the stages or values of which it is capable.
 It is this sort of variable finite, always pushing out beyond
 every bounded unit, or breaking out within it, which con-
 fronts us in the Platonic-Pythagorean Unlimited, or, as it
 was finally called, the Great and Small. As such it is the
 irrational, evil, essentially formless or flowing principle,
 which has to be dominated by " the One " or " the Limit "
 in order to give rise to everything intelligible or good. It
 is the indefinite element in the ideal world, which calls for
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 a first bounding by the One, in order to give rise to that
 whole range of precise, quantitative patterns, with which
 the Platonic Forms were ultimately identified. It is also
 the indefinite element in the world of the senses, whose
 bounding by precise, numerical ratios gives rise to whatever
 is healthful, strong, musical or visibly excellent. In itself,
 however, it admits only of a contradictious characterisation ;
 it is the " Others," the Great and Small, without any
 principle of unity or definition in itself. As soon as one
 seizes a part of it, and attempts to treat it as something
 definite and single, it will at once begin to evanesce into
 other parts, and these into other parts without end. And
 as soon as one imagines it as endowed with beginning,
 middle and end, one will find another beginning emerging
 before the first beginning, another end emerging after the
 first end, and another truer middle showing itself within
 the first middle. I need here only refer to the superb
 seventh hypothesis of the Platonic Parmenides for a full
 account of the tantalising and elusive behaviour of the
 Platonic infinite, whose complex, contradictious characteri-
 sation is only equalled by the still more complex and
 contradictious characterisation of his indefinite, super-
 essential One or Good.
 The Platonic mysticism passes away in the Aristotelian
 treatment of the infinite, but the essential features of the
 Platonic treatment remain. The infinite only exists after a
 fashion ; after another fashion it does not exist at all. It
 never exists in the sense that we ever actually have an infinitely
 large number of parts or elements of anything, nor anything
 which exceeds all things of limited bigness in its number or
 its size. The presence of infinity in a field is always some-
 thing facultative ; it means that we can go on stretching
 sizes and numbers in that field as much and as far as we
 like, that we can always go outside of any given size or
 number to the one lying beyond it. Whatever else may
 be true of this infinite, it is wholly incompatible with
 totality ; for something to be infinite means that one never
 can have all of it, only more and more of it. For Aristotle
 as for Quine it simply makes no sense to speak of an infinite
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 magnitude in connection with our whole cosmos ; infinite
 magnitude applies at best to the potential divisibility of a
 spatial stretch or of a temporal lapse, or to the endless
 potential augmentation of temporal lapses or numerical
 aggregates. Even this potential being of the infinite is,
 however, a rather queer sort of potentiality, for it is not a
 potentiality that can ever be translated into the actual.
 The Aristotelian treatment of the infinite is in effect a
 reductive treatment; our words suggest that infinity is a
 straightforward qualification of certain actual magnitudes,
 but those words only really make sense, if we can give them
 some complex and less obvious restatement. It is this
 reductive treatment of the infinite which has, in the main,
 prevailed in post-Renaissance thought. It prevails in Locke
 when he speaks of our idea of the infinite as an " endless
 growing idea," and when he denies that we ever have a
 positive and distinct idea of infinite magnitude. It prevails
 in Kant when he circumvents his antinomies by holding
 that, while there may very well be a regressus in indefinitum
 from one state to previous states, or from a whole to its
 parts, or from an event to its prior conditions, there cannot
 ever really be a regressus in infinitum which covers all the
 conditions or all the presuppositions of some actual stage of
 affairs. It also prevails in Hegel when he cries down his
 so-called " bad infinite " as the mere would-be negation
 of the finite, which latter always crops up again and again,
 and is never truly superseded; it prevails as much when he
 cries up the virtues of his " true infinite," which is merely
 his bad infinite grown staid and self-complacent, inasmuch
 as it has come to realise that there can be no other outcome
 of its whole vain effort at self-transcendence, but itself and
 itself alone. Nor is it possible to find any straightforward,
 whole-hearted espousal of the infinite in either Leibniz or
 Spinoza. The former may say that he believes in an actual
 infinite, but a man whose main reason for denying the
 reality of the extended world consists in the fact that it
 always melts away into parts within parts, and into parts
 outside parts, can hardly be said to show a very robust
 faith in the actual infinite. And Spinoza altered the whole
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 meaning of infinity by his identification of it with all-
 embracing, exhaustive totality, which-is also indivisible
 unity.
 The first attempt to give a non-reductive account of the
 infinite, in harmony with what our untutored verbal
 instincts might lead us to put forward, is to be found in
 the work of Bolzano, and, more fully and finally, in
 the work of Cantor. The latter managed to show that we
 can talk consistently about infinity, without needing to
 translate our talk into talk about the variable finite. He
 disposed effectively of the many apparent contradictions in
 straightforward accounts of the infinite which had made
 such translations seem necessary. He made short work of
 the supposed contradictions involved in exhausting the
 inexhaustible, or in completing the everlastingly incom-
 plete, for he showed that while it would be self-contradictory
 to speak of exhausting an infinite series or assemblage, in
 the sense of finding some last term to it, yet the very fact
 that we cannot thus exhaust it, means also that we can and
 do exhaust it in another manner. For if we ask what the
 number may be of the whole set of terms in some series
 lacking a final term-and it would be highly unnatural to
 say that such an assemblage had no number at all-we
 should be forced to say that it was a number different from,
 and exceeding the number of any set reachable in the
 ordered running through of such a class or series. It would
 be different from any such number, for the very reason that
 no instance of it could be reached in any such ordered run-
 ning through, and it would exceed any such reachable
 number in that a group or whole having this new sort of
 number would contain parts exemplifying all previous
 ordinary numbers, while none of these latter would
 contain parts which exemplified it. It is, in short,
 the number of an ordered progression lacking a final term,
 but it isn't a number anywhere to be found in such an
 ordered progression. It may therefore be said to lie
 outside of, and beyond the numbers reached in our advance
 along a progression which lacks a final term, and it may
 also be called the limit towards which such a series
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 perpetually aspires. But in another sense it does not really
 lie outside of the whole of such a progressive series for, in
 having the whole of that series, one automatically has an
 instance of the number in question. One cannot arrive at
 such a number by the steady stepwise addition of units
 which Cantor called his first principle of the formation of
 numbers, but one can and does arrive at it by considering
 all the terms reached by such a stepwise procedure, which
 Cantor called his second principle of the formation of num-
 bers.
 At the new conceptual level thus attained, the
 paradoxes attending our former conceptions of the infinite
 become the truisms stating its essential properties. It
 becomes plain that an infinite whole can't be increased or
 reduced by the addition or subtraction of a unit, nor yet
 of a finite number of such units ; it becomes plain, too, that
 an infinite whole can have infinite parts added to it, or
 taken away from it, while remaining just as large as ever.
 The most paradoxical property of an infinite whole, that
 it is possible to take parts from it, which are just as infinite
 as itself, and which are therefore (on a natural interpreta-
 tion) equal to itself, was in fact adopted by Dedekind as
 the defining property of an infinite assemblage. The work
 of Cantor took away the awe and mystery of the infinite ;
 he taught us to do sums with it ; he showed in fact, that
 there was nothing difficult about it. He himself seemed to
 enjoy the same sort of hob-nobbing acquaintance with the
 infinite that some of his Jewish forbears had with the
 Ancient of Days. And not only did he acquaint us with a
 single infinite, but he brought into our ken a whole family
 of infinites, each living above the next on an entirely
 different floor of the family mansion. In all this he was
 but developing and giving sense to a notion put forward
 in a mistaken form by Bolzano : that it is possible for one
 infinite aggregate to be larger than another.
 Hardly, however, had the infinite thus begun to be
 brought into focus, than the whole picture of it was again
 blurred. This new blurring was not connected with sup-
 posed contradictions in the notion of infinity, but with the
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 whole difficulty of being sure that anything really was
 infinite, or even that we could be clear in our minds what it
 would be like for something to be infinite. Russell, who
 had done so much to disseminate Cantor's notions, confused
 them by his extensional account of number, according to
 which numbers were to be identified with sets of classes
 which could be brought into one-one correlation with some
 chosen class. On such an account it became doubtful,
 not merely whether the notion of the infinite had an
 application, but even whether it had a distinguishable
 content. For unless there were at least one actual assemb-
 lage in our world having infinitely many members, the
 class of classes, membership of which would be tantamount
 to being of such an infinite number, would be simply null,
 and to be infinite in number would be quite the same
 as being both five and six in number, or as being anything
 else which has no application whatever. At first Russell
 tried to prove that there were certain infinite assemblages,
 but most of his proofs involved the lumping together of
 things best treated as of radically different type or level,
 and so not properly mentionable in a single breath.
 We were therefore obliged to assume the existence of
 such infinite classes, in order that the whole ordered,
 mathematical system could be rounded off and made to
 work. And Russell cast doubt on our power to carry
 out certain quite commonplace operations upon infinite
 aggregates ; we could not find the product of the numbers
 of such aggregates, unless we could select terms from them
 according to a definite and discoverable principle, and
 it wasn't clear that there always would be such a definite
 principle. And so while the square of the number of some
 simply infinite aggregate would at times be simply infinite,
 there would be times when it would have no assignable
 value whatsoever. There might also, on account of similar
 selective difficulties, be certain transfinite assemblages
 concerning which it was impossible to say whether one was
 or was not larger than the other. And the whole set of
 possible rearrangements of finite and transfinite series, to
 which Cantor had assigned numbers of his " second class,"
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 had to be thrown back into a conceptual melting pot,
 since it was quite doubtful whether there always would be
 rules or principles on which such rearrangements could
 be carried out.
 The difficulties raised by Russell were carried a stage
 further by the verificationists and the intuitionists. For
 them the infinite had no meaning at all except where
 there was a rule or principle guiding us through its laby-
 rinth ; an assemblage such as that of the points of space,
 or that of all real numbers, to which no definite principle
 of arrangement corresponded, should not be said to be
 infinite in number. Nor would they see sense in a mathe-
 matical question to which no general method of solution
 corresponded ; a problem that we could solve only by
 carrying out an infinite number of steps, or by running
 through an infinity of cases, could not, on their ruling, be
 mathematically significant. To ask whether there are or
 are not three successive sevens in the development ofs , or
 whether all numbers of the form22 +-1 are or are not
 factorable, is to pose a wholly senseless enquiry, even if,
 embarrassingly, it suddenly acquires significance when some-
 one hits on an instance which verifies or refutes it. Here we
 are back, after a long series of unprofitable windings, at the
 facultative infinite or variable finite of Aristotle ; the
 infinite can be said to exist only so far as we can apply a
 rule, or can carry out a procedure, over and over again
 without let or hindrance; it never exists as something
 actual and complete, to which our precise route of
 approach, whether haphazard or systematic, must be
 indifferent.
 The last stage in this gradual obscuration of the infinite
 is to be found in the interesting article of Quine and
 Goodman entitled " Steps toward a Constructive Nomin-
 alism." Having tried at first to prove the existence of
 certain infinite classes, by methods which involved the
 relaxation of type-restrictions, and having found such
 methods treacherous and questionable, Quine was led
 to conceive a general loathing for the infinite, which was
 part and parcel of his wider disgust for " entities of higher
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 order." For Quine it became supremely dangerous to
 depart in the smallest degree from a purely syncategorematic
 or contextual use of predicates and common nouns, so as
 to make them even appear to be the names of peculiar
 entities. This deep danger existed, to Quine's fine percep-
 tions, even when we merely spoke in general fashion about
 the character of some object, when we said that it was of a
 certain shade of brown, or that it would be beautiful whatever
 its colour. Not only must we never seriously employ
 abstract nouns as the subjects of sentences ; we must never
 even make use of variables for which predicates would serve
 as values. To say that a thing is of some character or other,
 is to say that there are characters, or that characters exist,
 and from such a dangerous flight of hypostatisation one
 must shrink intransigently. In a style of speech thus
 puritanically restricted, there can of course be small room
 for that freely ranging talk about all numbers having
 certain properties, or about some number having a certain
 property, in which classical arithmetic principally consists; a
 formula like (n) (n + n = 2n) will at best be a set of meaning-
 less marks from which meaningful formulae can be derived
 by appropriate substitution and translation. There can,
 in such a linguistic scheme, be little place for the infinite,
 whose very definition normally involves the mention of all
 finite or ordinary numbers.
 There is yet another reason for Quine's thoroughgoing
 renunciation of the infinite. He takes with extraordinary
 seriousness all that the physicists have told us about the
 limited divisibility of natural things and processes, or about
 the limited extent of all space or all time. In a cosmos
 severely limited as our own is thought to be, we can,
 according to Quine, only manage to talk about infinite
 aggregates in so far as we suppose the existence somewhere
 of an infinite number of abstract objects, in addition to
 that finite number of concrete objects actually present in
 our cosmos. Nor can we hope to translate statements about
 the infinitely large, or even about what is merely very
 large, into long conjunctions, or long sets of statements
 about their individual components: not only would this
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 take us too long, but we could not actually find the room in
 our world for such statements or sets of statements. Logi-
 cians, already so much harassed and badgered, must* now
 submit to yet further restrictions ; their notions must not
 be so many as to require the symbolic service of more than
 the total number of objects, or empty spaces in our
 universe. Nor must their sentences ever be so long as to
 be incapable of being inscribed within our cosmic boun-
 daries ; there is no place at all for that indefinite concatena-
 tion of expressions into ever longer expressions which is
 both demanded and permitted in classical syntax. It
 seems plain that, by a long and circuitous route, we have
 ended up in a finitism which surpasses even that of Aristotle
 in its narrow rigour.
 II.
 I have now hurried over the whole historical terrain of
 thought about the infinite; I descend into the field to
 make certain personal observations. Some of these are
 expressions of my own persuasion or intuition, for which I
 can indeed give reasons, but never wholly adequate or
 convincing ones. But if Quine and others can be permitted
 their intuitions, which may exact from them such important
 sacrifices as that of all abstract objects and with them the
 infinite, I too may be allowed my own internal promptings,
 which may lead me to jettison much accepted doctrine.
 The first point that I wish to make is that I think that
 the work of Cantor, and that of his many developers and
 elucidators, has effectively removed all the apparent
 contradictions in our notion of the actual infinite. We are
 now past the point at which we could find it absurd to
 speak about the whole of some series lacking a final term, or
 to say that its number exceeds the numbers that can be
 reached from zero by a stepwise increase by unity. We are
 also past the point at which we find it shocking to say that
 a whole can at times be equal to its proper part, or that it
 may be impossible at times to reduce or increase a whole
 by the subtraction or addition of a unit. All such state-
 ments obviously involve new and stretched uses of the
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 terms "whole," "part," "number," "equal" and so
 forth, and it would be open to a determined finitist to deny
 them application beyond the realm of countable, and
 therefore finite aggregates. But if we do decide so to
 employ them, the work of Cantor shows that we can do
 so without any contradiction, and without coming into
 conflict with our former principles, as long as we allow
 these latter to apply only to things finite. What we still
 must show is that this whole new extension and enrich-
 ment of our talk is in any way profitable, and that we
 genuinely have something in mind when we round off our
 language in this manner.
 The second point I wish to make is that I don't think
 we have the smallest reason for thinking that there is some
 actual set of things in our world which is infinitely numerous.
 There may be such a set, but again there may not. I
 find no obscurity in the notion that there should be physically
 minimal objects and happenings in our world, any more
 than I find it obscure that there should be minimal portions
 of experienced space and time ; on such suppositions sets of
 parts of any finite thing or happening will be finite, not
 infinite in number. I also find no difficulty in believing
 that our world may have that closed, re-entrant structure,
 and that consequent finite extent, with which modern
 physics credits it ; I have, in fact, found it an amusing
 exercise to determine the optics, and to work out the
 visual appearances, in a very small world of this kind.
 But I do not think the question whether the things in our
 world are finite or infinite in number, is of any philosophical
 importance whatsoever ; the philosopher has to ask what
 it would be for things to be infinite in number, and what
 might be the consequences and the possible applications
 of this notion, not whether it has any actual applica-
 tions. Philosophers who ignore these questions, because
 they allow themselves to be bemused by the latest findings
 of the physicists, are in no better case than their pre-
 decessors, who let all their analyses be distorted by the
 findings of the evolutionary biologists.
 This brings me to my third obvious, but important
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 point; that what we mean by infinity, or by any other
 numerical concept, can never be bound up with the actual
 contents of our world, nor affected by their numbers, their
 orderings or the relational bonds that connect them. Being
 three in number, or being infinitely numerous, would be
 exactly what they now are, and would carry with them the
 same body of implied properties, whether our world con-
 tained many or few objects, and however these might be
 connected or varied. This means that there is something
 radically unsatisfactory and misleading in an extensional
 account of number on the lines put forward by Russell;
 classes or sets may in some sense be the subjects of number,
 but we cannot profitably identify numbers with sets, or
 with sets of sets of objects that are anywhere present in our
 world. Though the application of numbers may be to the
 most purely extensional aspect of things-we may say, with
 Hegel, to things in their more otherness and mutual exter-
 nality-yet it is none the less impossible to talk of them
 satisfactorily except in an intensional idiom. Russell main-
 tained that his extensional treatment had the great merit
 of making the existence of numbers indubitable ; the class
 of trios certainly existed if we could but find a single instance
 of three objects, whereas the property of being three in
 number was a metaphysical or Platonic entity, which it
 was hard for us to lay hold of or to track down. He
 therefore identified each number with what we should
 ordinarily call the class of its instances, instances not,
 however, brought together by virtue of showing forth a
 common kind or character, but solely by virtue of the
 possibility of pairing their members, one for one, with the
 members of other similar instances, a procedure which
 succeeded, surprisingly, in sorting them out into mutually
 exclusive classes, while yet involving nothing peculiar
 in the case of each such class. A set of things does
 not, on such an account, belong to one such class because
 it is of a certain number ; to be of a certain number simply
 is to belong to one such class. But this ingenious analysis
 has the monstrous consequence that if our world contained
 no more than 728 objects-and we refused to augment their
 D
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 numbers either by the free manufacture of fictions, or by
 the introduction of objects from higher levels of discourse-
 all numbers above 728 would become confounded in a
 common nothingness, and it would be quite the same to
 say that certain things were 728, or 1029, or infinite in
 number. And we could only talk significantly about things
 having certain high or transfinite numbers, if there were
 things actually exemplifying the numbers in question, a
 thing which, in the case of the infinite, we could never
 know or prove. Here we have the old Anselmian situation
 of essence entailing existence, with the queer added corollary
 that non-existence entails the annihilation of essence. If
 this sort of analysis is the only way to steer clear of the
 difficulties of a metaphysical Platonism, then it is possible
 to evade such difficulties at too great a price. The same
 may be said of all those ingenious nominalistic analyses of
 such simple statements as " There are more dogs than cats,"
 which have been put forward by Quine and Goodman.
 The sort of treatment that we call " intensional " will
 not, however, profit us much, unless the things said about
 the infinite, or about other numbers taken in intension, differ
 profoundly from the things said about the infinite, and
 about other numbers taken in extension, and that not
 merely in the comparatively trivial respect mentioned by
 Quine: that there may be more than a single intension
 corresponding to a given extension. We cannot bring out
 the full difference between an intensional and a purely
 extensional treatment of some subject-matter without
 pointing to modal differences ; intensional accounts cover
 what could be the case even in circumstances remote from
 the actual, whereas extensional treatments confine themselves
 to what actually is the case. Now it is plain that we should
 not hesitate to apply any of our notions of number to
 things not in any way actual ; there were seven recognised
 sages in antiquity and four recognised cardinal virtues, but
 there might very well have been four sages and seven virtues.
 We should even go further and say that being a recognised
 sage would maintain its difference from being a recognised
 cardinal virtue even if there were no recognised sages or
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 virtues, and no things at all which were collectively four
 or seven. Varying sets of objects will all be reduced to a
 common nothingness when their constituent objects vanish,
 but it doesn't make sense to say the same of being of this
 sort or being of that sort, or of any other attribute or charac-
 terising feature. If we like, in this connection, to make use
 of the highly confusing term " existence," then we may say
 that the existence-conditions of things taken in intension differ
 profoundly from the existence-conditions of things taken in
 extension ; a collection of things may be said to exist
 when there are at least two or (by a stretch of charity) a
 single object in that set, whereas a kind of thing may be
 said to exist even when it is only possible for there to be
 things of that sort. It will not, in short, be actual embodi-
 ment, nor yet the mere significance of its verbal counter-
 part, which will constitute existence for an attribute ; its
 existence will consist in the logically possible existence of its
 instances. Such a manner of speech is, in fact, the one we
 most frequently adopt; we do not say that a set of
 salmon-pink objects exist, unless there actually are objects
 of this colour, whereas we should not hesitate to say that
 there was a shade of colour called salmon-pink, if it were
 merely possible that there should be objects of that shade.
 In this sense there is a colour between red and blue, and no
 colour at all between red and green, even though both can
 be talked of with equal significance. The only axiom of
 infinity that can therefore be tolerated in a philosophical
 account of number is one which defines the significance,
 and which asserts the possibility, that certain things should
 (in their collective capacity) be infinite in number ; this
 is the only sense in which the whole series of natural numbers
 can be said to exist, and it is in this sense, therefore, that
 there can be transfinite numbers beyond them. All this is
 in effect acknowledged by Russell when he makes use of his
 axiom of infinity only as a protasis in other theorems, and
 never as a proposition independently asserted ; his whole
 approach is, however, such as to belie this limitation.
 The intensional treatment we are recommending may
 be Platonic in that it allows us to speak of " being infinite
 D2
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 in number " just as it allows us to speak of" being red in
 colour," but it need not be Platonic in some dubious or
 noxious sense. To speak in this manner is not really to
 suppose that, in addition to the ordinary objects in our
 world, there also are an indefinite number of extraordinary
 objects. To be red or to be infinitely numerous are not,
 properly speaking, entities, nor are the words which express
 them, properly speaking, names ; they are, if one so likes
 to put it, merely sorts of things, of which things may, in
 their individual or their collective capacity, be. Their
 verbal expressions merely tell us what sort of thing we have
 before us, and whether of the same, or of a different sort
 from other things. And if we do sometimes speak of them
 as of things enjoying a certain style or manner of existence,
 we can also make plain that we intend no more by such
 a style or manner of existence than we intend by the merely
 possible existence of ordinary things of certain sorts. We
 may here advert to Quine's queer doctrine that to speak
 generally of the character of some object is to commit our-
 selves to an unwarrantable ontology, that quantification
 necessarily goes hand in hand with reification. Because
 the statement "Some men are amorous " can, with a
 certain amount of creaking, be transformed into the state-
 ment " There are amorous men," it is therefore assumed
 that any and every use of " some," " every," " a certain "
 " any " and so forth, must necessarily involve an assumption
 of existence, and that not in an innocent and translatable,
 but in some dubious and noxious sense. There is only
 confusion in this doctrine. A man who says that something
 is of some colour or other is not reifying colours, any more
 than a man who says that he will find his way somehow to
 London need be reifying manners. Nor is one practising
 reification if one defines being infinite in number in terms of
 having proper parts which are of every natural number,
 and if one then goes on to define the latter in some form of
 the accepted rigmarole which amounts to saying that they
 are the total progeny which can be generated out of being
 nought in number, through repeated fecundation of this notion
 and its offspring, by the relation of being one more in number.
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 We may note further that not only are the phrases
 " being three in number " or " being infinitely numerous "
 not necessarily to be taken as names of peculiar entities ;
 it is not even necessary to take them as applying to such
 entities. We may here repudiate with peculiar vigour
 Frege's doctrine that it is to class-concepts alone that
 numerical predicates can be properly said to pertain,
 that it is being a recognised sage in antiquity that is seven in
 number, and not Thales and his confreres. This view is
 mistaken for the double reason that, if there is a sense in
 which being an ancient sage can have number, then it will be
 one in number and not seven, and also because the exempli-
 fication of number by a set of things does not at all depend
 upon their being of a common sort or character. Of some
 sort each of a number of things must undoubtedly be, since
 it is only as exemplifying a sort that a thing can be said to
 be a thing at all, but it is by no means necessary that the
 things which collectively are of a given number should be
 homogeneous rather than heterogeneous. My arm, your
 toothbrush and Quavam es Sultaneh are three in number,
 and they are as much three in number as are the three
 Norns or the three Persons of the Trinity, but it is mere
 artificiality to demand that they should therefore be
 reduced to some common denomination. And it is merely
 our difficulty that we cannot refer to things having certain
 large or transfinite numbers, except as being all the cases
 of a common sort of kind. We may note, further, that we
 have no need to say that it is to classes or sets that numbers
 pertain, if by " classes " or " sets " are meant, not things
 in the plural, but mysterious higher-order compartments
 into which things may be herded or concentrated. Quite
 obviously it is to things in the plural that numbers are
 normally applicable, even if, in our charity, and for verbal
 convenience, we also extend this privilege to things taken
 in the singular, or even to nothing whatever. It is not my
 pen singly, nor your arm singly, nor Quavam es Sultaneh
 singly, that is three in number, nor yet any higher order
 unity that these objects may form. They are so collectively
 only in the sense that they are so co-operatively ; we must
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 not, except for mere verbal convenience, confuse the
 collective possession of a property by things in the plural,
 with the non-collective possession of a property by some
 single entity called a collection. In uttering these forgotten
 truisms I am not, of course saying that, in addition to being
 many, things may not also be multiple many, or multiply
 multiply many, and so on indefinitely, and that, from the
 standpoint of such multiplied manifoldness, what is simply
 manifold may not rightly be treated as unitary. Nor am
 I casting scorn on any of the convenient, if misleading,
 devices and distinctions of the logic of classes, for which
 my respect is immeasurable. I would not, further, wish
 to deny that there is a legitimate higher-order application
 of numbers to sorts of things, and to pluralities of things, and
 to sorts of pluralities and pluralities of sorts, and to any com-
 plication of sorts and pluralities one might care to elaborate.
 I am only denying that, in all this collective and abstract
 treatment of things abstractly and collectively treated, and
 in all the resultant piling of adverb upon prior adverb,
 our talk ever loses its ultimate touch with ordinary things
 (whether actual or possible), however cumbrous it might
 sometimes be to express this.
 There are, no doubt, certain perplexing peculiarities in
 the grammer of numerical statements-the joint ownership
 of numerical predicates is particularly teasing-which
 suggest a recourse to further reductions. We find it
 illuminating to hold that numerical predicates " aren't really
 predicates at all," any more than existence " really " is a
 predicate, or diversity " really" is a relation between
 objects. To say that something of a certain sort exists is
 not " really " to say that this object is of a certain other
 sort ; it is merely to say that one has an object of the first
 sort in question. In the same way to say that an object
 and an object are diverse, is not " really " to point to a
 relation between them, but merely to say that one has
 objects, as distinct from an object, to deal with. In much
 the same way to attribute numbers to objects is, in a sense,
 merely to give an exact specification of diversity, to indicate
 with precision what objects we have before us for characteri-
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 zation, without saying anything about their kind or character.
 Quite plainly to say that one has four things before one, is
 not different from saying that one has something of an
 unspecified sort before one, and something else of an
 unspecified sort before one, and something else of an
 unspecified sort before one, and yet again something else
 of an unspecified sort before one. And if one possessed a
 set of coordinated pens, such as those with which it was
 fabled President Roosevelt used to sign cheques under the
 New Deal, and if the dimensions of our universe allowed
 such a set of pens to be infinite, rather than finite in number,
 then it would be perfectly easy to write down a specification
 of diversity which would amount to the attribution of a
 transfinite number. All this is brought out clearly in
 Tarski's illuminating notation, where we express number
 by special variants of the existential operator, under whose
 inverted E various numerical subscripts are written. But
 even if numbers are thereby shown " not really " to be
 properties, any more than they really can be considered as
 classes, our treatment of them remains intensional, since
 their " existence " will amount to no more than the mere
 possibility of a certain specified diversity, of which their
 " instances " will be actual realizations.
 We have strayed long and far into the general philosophy
 of number, a procedure necessitated by the technical
 barnacles which have been allowed to encrust every inch
 of the subject ; we may now return to the narrower limits
 of infinity. We have disposed of the general, threshold
 difficulties which concern the notion, but we have yet to
 find sufficient motive for framing it, or an adequate
 guarantee that we can attach more than an empty,
 syntactical meaning to the terms that seem to stand for
 it. We have said that the only sense in which the existence
 of infinite numbers can be philosophically significant, is the
 sense in which it is logically possible for things to be infinitely
 numerous, in other words, the sense in which it is logically
 possible for them to be of a number greater than, and
 different from any that can be elicited out of the directly
 showable numbers, through repeated use of the notion
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 "greater by unity." We here come face to face with a
 doctrine that has acquired much recent authority ; that
 modal distinctions merely reflect arbitrary linguistic choices,
 and that it is we who, by determining what we will, or
 won't, or may say in certain circumstances, also fix the
 bounds of the necessary and the possible. On such a view
 it would be good to replace all ordinary, first-order talk
 about what might or must or couldn't be the case, by a
 corresponding metalinguistic set of verbal prescriptions,
 permissions and prohibitions ; our straightforward talk
 about objects could then be left in extensional purity. On
 this view it would merely depend on a linguistic fiat whether
 it was or was not possible for there to be infinitely many
 objects. This whole approach to modality may, however,
 be described as unrealistic, if not frivolous. It ignores the
 fact that our decisions to speak in one way rather than
 another are by no means arbitrary, but profoundly moti-
 vated, and that they depend not merely on personal habit
 or inclination, but on our deep intercourse with, and
 repeated turning to, the matter on hand. We may, if
 we like, say that there is a " lie on the land " in the realm
 of essence, just as there undoubtedly is a " lie of the land "
 in the realm of existence ; this " lie of the land " never
 forces us to do linguistic road-making or bridge-building in
 a given manner, but it none the less makes it easier and
 more " natural " to proceed in one manner rather than
 another. It is not unlike Hume's " gentle force " of associa-
 tion, which while it does not compel us to say one thing to
 the exclusion of others, none the less sets bounds to our
 linguistic liberty, and in the end " everywhere prevails."
 Applying these thoughts in the field of numbers, it would
 no doubt have been possible for us to have called a halt
 in our formation of numerical notions after the number
 Ten (as Plato and the Pythagoreans are reported to have
 done) ; we could then have refused to predicate number
 of the Apostles, or the States of the American Union.
 Such a decision would, however, be arbitrary in a vicious
 sense ; it would have involved a wanton refusal, not based
 on differences in the material on hand, to carry on with a
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 certain general procedure. We are subject to a rational
 obligation, not at all minatory and coercive, but insistently,
 if mildly hortatory, which urges us always to leave room
 in our thought and language for sets of things exemplifying
 an unending series of natural numbers, each arising otit
 of its predecessor when an aggregate is increased by a unit.
 And being obliged to admit all these natural numbers, we
 are also obliged to admit the possibility of aggregates which
 have parts such that each of the natural numbers will be
 exemplified in some of them, and which can't therefore
 themselves be of any of the ordinary natural numbers.
 And since it would be highly unnatural to say that they
 weren't of any number at all, we are urged to say that
 they are of a number different from, and greater than, any
 of the natural numbers. We might indeed come to admit
 the existence of such transfinite numbers by mere reflection
 on the existence of the ordinary natural number series;
 this latter series exists in the only sense in which numbers
 can be said to exist at all, and hence the former also exists,
 even if at a higher level of discourse, as the number of the
 latter. We may then be led, by precisely similar considera-
 tions, to concede numbers to aggregates of aggregates, or
 to aggregates of ordered aggregates, much more intricately
 organized than are simple progressions ; we shall then also
 be led, by Cantor's irrefragable arguments, to accord other,
 higher kinds of infinite number to such aggregates. In all
 this process of extending our notions, we might stop short
 where we wished, but it would be highly unnatural to stop
 short anywhere. We were, in a sense, committed to the
 whole indefinitely ascending hierarchy, on the occasion
 when we first passed in thought or experience from a unit
 to a couple, or from a couple to a triad. Those who, like
 Quine, seek to check the natural increase of the numerical
 population so as never to exceed the resources of our actual
 universe, commit a fault worse than that strangulation
 of births condemned by the Church; they commit the
 fault practised by all unjust judges and idolaters since the
 beginning of the world: that of undue deference to the
 powers that be.
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 We have not, however, given a satisfactory justification
 of our introduction of the infinite, as long as it merely
 serves as some great gilt cupola rounding off a conceptual
 edifice, not itself made of solid materials nor resting on
 solid underpinning, so as to permit of circumambulation
 or closer examination. The standing objection to the
 infinite is, after all, that it is impossible to produce an
 instance of it, as one can very well produce instances of
 lesser numbers. And even if such an instance were forth-
 coming, we could never be sure that it was infinite ; we
 should need all time to correlate its members, one for one
 with the finite inductive numerals, and should therefore,
 have neither occasion nor need to speak of a number lying
 beyond all natural numbers. These considerations, as well
 as a large number of fallacious ones, have led philosophers
 in all ages to attempt reductive analyses of the infinite in
 terms of the variable finite, and to condemn other ways
 of speaking as metaphysical flatus vocis. Against all such
 tendencies and difficulties I should like to take a stand ;
 I want to maintain, on grounds that are themselves intuitive,
 that though the infinite may be for us no more than a
 concept, it might also very well have been an intuition,
 that it is, in fact, no more than an accidental infirmity
 that we have to grope and gesture after it as we actually
 do. I also wish to maintain that our difficulty in exhibiting
 the infinite isn't really the difficulty of exhibiting something
 quite unlike anything we have ever seen and known ; in a
 sense, its exhibition would involve nothing novel, and we
 know exactly what it would be like. It is, in fact, no more
 inaccessible to imagination or sense-perception than any
 other highly complex object or property. We may here
 point out that not all instances of number are known for
 what they are by that step-by-step procedure known as
 counting ; there are many lower degrees of number that
 can be recognized and exhibited non-successively. We can
 see at a glance, and can plainly recognize, such inferior
 grades of number as unity, duality, triplicity and so forth ;
 shepherds, company commanders and other practised
 persons carry this sort of immediate discrimination much
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 further. We can also sometimes see at a glance how a
 certain quartet is made up out of two couples, or how a
 group of eight consists of parts which are respectively
 five and three in number. What then is the fundamental
 difficulty in supposing that such a non-counting, non-
 successive apprehension of number might not be indefinitely
 extended, so that one might see at a glance how each of
 the natural numbers was exemplified in a certain part of
 an assemblage before us, and could therefore also recognize
 at a glance the presence of that first simple infinity which
 sums up them all ? I can see no difficulty in the supposition.
 It is plain, further, that, even where our apprehension of
 number is successive, it may none the less fall wholly within
 the present (which won't deserve any qualification of
 " specious," since it is the only present we can understand
 or know). What then is the difficulty in supposing that
 our present faculties of time-discrimination might be so
 indefinitely refined and sharpened, as to take in, within the
 limits of the present, one of those infinitely numerous,
 indefinitely diminishing Zenonian series, to which our
 present poor capacities give an air of paradox and absurdity ?
 And what further difficulty could there be in supposing
 that our sense of what is actual and present might not be
 so infinitely extended, as never to break up into any succession
 of disjoined phases, only linked to each other by memory
 or anticipation ? If this were the case, we might certainly
 enjoy an unending counting apprehension, which would
 also be, throughout its undivided extent, an apprehension of
 the actual infinite. If anyone doubts whether I really
 know what I mean by the alternatives I am putting forward,
 I confess I can't convince him that I do know it ; I am
 in the position of Hume when he tells us that he knows
 what a certain intermediate shade of grey is like, of which
 he cannot produce an instance.
 I shall conclude my contribution by saying that I see
 no difficulty, apart from the purely human difficulties I
 have mentioned, in the making of an infinite number of
 arbitrary selections from some aggregate before us, or in the
 carrying out of an infinite set of arbitrary pairings among
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 the terms of two such aggregates. There can therefore be
 no reason, apart from human infirmity, why we should not
 be able to refer to some infinite set of objects except as
 being of a common sort or kind, or why we should not be
 able to predicate equality between two such aggregates
 except by virtue of a specifiable one-one relation among
 their members. Nor is there any but an accidental human
 reason why we should not be able to order a transfinite
 aggregate except by means of a specifiable serial relation.
 The bearing of all this on the Theorem of Zermelo, on the
 Multiplicative Axiom, and on the equality or inequality
 of certain transfinite numbers, may be left to others more
 competent to determine. But I see no reason why an
 infinite aggregate, arranged as are the points in the con-
 tinuum, or consisting of all the series belonging to Cantor's
 second class, should not, like some simply infinite progres-
 sion, become a direct object of intuitive apprehension. I
 also have no reason to doubt that it might be perfectly
 possible to carry out in a single flash of vision, some calcula-
 tion involving a transfinite number of steps, and that it
 would then be possible to write the result down by means of
 an infinite series of simultaneously functioning pens. It
 would then be 'quite definite whether there were or were
 not three successive sevens in the development of 7r, and
 the Law of Excluded Middle would apply in this field
 without any restriction whatever.
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 PROFESSOR FINDLAY'S paper is concerned with a large
 number of questions, and I cannot hope to discuss them
 all ; I shall therefore select a few which seem to me to be
 important and shall try to say something about them. I
 must emphasize, however, that I find the whole subject
 extremely difficult, and that I do not feel at all certain of
 the truth of my remarks.
 I.
 I shall not comment in any detail on the first, largely
 historical, section of Findlay's paper, although I find some
 of his statements very puzzling. For instance, to mention
 only one point, he says that Russell " cast doubt on our
 power to carry out certain quite commonplace operations
 upon infinite aggregates," and seems to imply that Russell
 was somehow responsible for the difficulties associated with
 the axiom of choice. But the truth is surely that certain
 mathematical proofs involved tacit application of the
 principle, or assumption, that given a class K whose members
 are mutually exclusive classes none of which is empty,
 there exists a class which has exactly one member in
 common with each member of K1 ; and, as Russell says,
 it was Zermelo's merit to have made the assumption
 explicit." Now, this principle, which is equivalent to the
 principle that every class can be well-ordered, has been
 challenged (1) on the ground that it does not seem to be
 logically necessary and hence should not be accepted as a
 logical axiom, and (2) on the ground that it is " non-
 effective." I gather from Findlay's paper that he attaches
 no weight to the second objection ; but he does not discuss
 the first objection and I do not know what he would say
 about it. In any case, my point is that it is very misleading
 on Findlay's part to talk as if the realization of the fact
 that the axiom of choice is involved in certain proofs in
 1 Cf., e.g., B. Russell, " On Some Difficulties in the Theory of Transfinite
 Numbers and Order Types," Proc. of the London Mathematical Soc., 2nd series,
 vol. 4 (1906), pp. 29-53. Cf. also Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
 (London, 1919, 2nd ed., 1920), chapter XII.
 S Zermelo's original axiom was different but equivalent.
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 the theory of sets, and hence of the fact that these proofs
 are invalid if the axiom be rejected, were a stage in the
 " gradual obscuration of the infinite."
 Another point which I wish to mention briefly concerns
 Findlay's criticism of Frege. Findlay says that he wishes
 to repudiate with " peculiar vigour " Frege's doctrine that
 it is to class-concepts alone that numerical predicates can
 be properly said to pertain. But in fact Findlay's criticism
 of Frege's doctrine, far from being " peculiarly vigorous,"
 seems to me to be peculiarly weak. Findlay says that it
 is " quite obviously " to things in the plural that numbers
 are normally applicable ; but what does he mean here by
 " things in the plural"? What does it mean to suppose,
 for instance, that I am attributing the number four to
 "things in the plural" when I say "The number of
 armchairs in my study is four " ? The only meaning I can
 attach to the phrase is that, when I make the statement,
 I am attributing the number four to a certain physical
 collection of objects ; as Frege, however, points out, a
 number cannot be uniquely attributed to a physical collec-
 tion. To use one of his examples,3 we can say with equal
 truth" Here are four companies," and " Here are 500 men."
 And the reason why both these propositions are true is
 precisely that a numerical statement contains an assertion
 about a concept. I can find nothing in Findlay's arguments
 which invalidates this doctrine or which gives an answer
 to the question as to how, if a numerical statement is not
 about a concept, we can truly attribute different numbers
 to the same physical collection. My arm, your toothbrush
 and Quavam es Sultaneh can be anything in number unless
 reference to a concept is specified ; and I think it is entirely
 wrong to say that if there is a sense in which " being an
 ancient age" can have number, it will be one in number
 and not seven. Although we do not normally say that the
 concept " being an ancient sage" has the number seven,
 Frege clearly explains what he means by this, I fully under-
 stand the explanation, and so, I feel sure, does Findlay.
 3 The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. by J. L. Austin (Oxford, 1950), p. 59e.
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 Let us turn, however, to what is, after all, the subject
 of our symposium, namely, to the concept of the infinite.
 What exactly is it that Findlay wishes to say about it ?
 Although I have read his paper several times, I am not at
 all clear what his views actually are. He says, referring
 to the work of the verificationists and the intuitionists,
 " Here we are back, after a long series of unprofitable
 windings, at the facultative infinite or variable finite of
 Aristotle ; the infinite can be said to exist only so far as
 we can apply a rule, or carry out a procedure, over and
 over again without let or hindrance; it never exists as
 something actual and complete. .. ." It would seem that
 Findlay wishes to maintain that the infinite does exist as
 something " actual and complete "; but I can find in
 his paper neither any clear statement as to what the words
 " actual " and. " complete " here mean, nor any clear
 argument in support of his claim. The only part of his
 paper which seems to me to bear on the problem is the
 last one in which he points out that we can sometimes see
 at a glance how a certain quartet is made up of two
 couples, or how a given group of eight consists of parts
 which are respectively five and three in number, and then
 asks " What . . . is the fundamental difficulty in supposing
 that such a non-counting, non-successive apprehension of
 number might not be indefinitely extended, so that one
 might see at a glance how each of the natural numbers
 was exemplified in a certain part of an assemblage before
 us, and could therefore also recognize at a glance the
 presence of that first simple infinity which sums up them all?"
 He answers his own question by saying that he sees no
 difficulty in the supposition. I, on the other hand, see a
 very great difficulty in it, which is as follows. Findlay
 talks here as if an infinite series, say the series of natural
 numbers, were a series in the same sense of the word
 " series " as that in which a finite series is a series. And
 he talks as if aleph-nought were the sum of the series of
 natural numbers in the same sense of the word " sum " as
 that in which a finite number may be said to be the sum
 of other finite numbers. But this is not so ; aleph-nought
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 is the limit of the series of natural numbers ; and a limit
 is not a sum in the sense in which we use the word " sum "
 in connexion with finite series. I think, therefore, that
 Findlay's analogy between seeing at a glance how a quartet
 is made up of two couples and how aleph-nought is " made
 up " of the natural numbers which it " sums up " simply
 breaks down.
 Let me try to put the matter in a different way. Findlay
 claims (and this seems to me to be the core of his paper
 so far as the problem of infinity is concerned) that it is
 logically possible that an infinite series should become a
 direct object of intuitive apprehension. But this supposition
 makes no sense unless it makes sense to speak of an infinite
 series as something " complete " ; now Findlay realizes, of
 course, that an infinite series cannot (logically) be " com-
 plete " in the sense in which to say that a series is complete
 entails that it has a last member. So he must attach to
 the word " complete," when he talks of the infinite as
 being actual and complete, some other meaning. But
 what is that meaning? I am afraid I do not see that
 Findlay has done anything towards explaining it ; he may
 perhaps say that he is so using the word that if it is logically
 possible for an infinite series to become a direct object of
 intuitive apprehension, it will follow that the infinite is not
 a name for a rule but exists as something actual and
 complete. But he has neither given nor attempted to give
 any argument for thinking that the supposition is logically
 possible. Those who maintain that the infinite is a name
 for a rule would of course say that Findlay's supposition is
 meaningless. I think he has certainly failed to explain its
 meaning (if it has any), and I can't therefore see that he
 has done much to advance our understanding of the
 subject.
 II.
 I should like now to discuss what seems to me to be
 one of the main difficulties connected with our problem.
 G. H. Hardy has said " Pure mathematics . . . seems to
 me a rock on which all idealism founders ; 317 is a prime,
 not because we think so, or because our minds are shaped
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 in one way rather than another, but because it is so, because
 mathematical reality is built that way."4 And also " I
 believe that mathematical reality lies outside us, that our
 function is to discover or observe it, and that the theorems
 which we prove, and which we describe grandiloquently
 as our 'creations,' are simply our notes of our observa-
 tions."5 I believe this idea is one of the main sources of
 the temptation to talk about the infinite in the sort of way
 that Findlay does. Let us take an example which arises
 naturally out of the last paragraph of Findlay's paper.
 Suppose Findlay says " Surely, the continuum hypothesis is
 either true or false." What can this mean ? It may mean
 that the continuum hypothesis is decidable: in other words,
 that the continuum hypothesis can be either proved or
 disproved in an axiomatic system (Zermelo's or a similar
 one) of set theory. G6del has shown, however, that the
 continuum hypothesis is consistent with the axioms of set
 theory (if they are consistent) ; that is to say, that the
 hypothesis cannot be disproved in a system based on those
 axioms.6 This still leaves open the possibility that the
 hypothesis can be proved in the system ; and if it were
 proved, we could say that it was true, and hence of course
 either true or false. But let us suppose that it has also
 been shown that the continuum hypothesis cannot be proved
 on the basis of the existing axioms (though this, so far as I
 know, has not been shown). In this case, one might
 construct alternative systems of set theory, and the position
 would be similar to that of alternative systems of geometry.
 I do not see what could be meant, in such circumstances,
 by asking whether the continuum hypothesis was true or
 false, or saying that it must be either true or false, any
 more than I can see what could be meant by asking whether
 the parallel postulate was true or false. Perhaps I am wrong
 in drawing this analogy ; if so, I hope I shall be corrected ;
 but it seems to me that, in the circumstances I am imagin-
 4 A Mathematician's Apology (Cambridge, 1940), p. 70.
 6 Op. cit., pp. 63-64.
 8 K. G6del, The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Con-
 tinuum-Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory (Princeton, 1940).
 E
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 ing, the analogy would be quite close. Does Findlay wish
 to maintain that the question would make sense ?
 It may however be said' that even if the continuum
 hypothesis were shown to be undecidable, it would still be
 either true or false, and one may support the statement by
 pointing out that it is conceivable that a new set of axioms
 for set theory should be constructed, in which the continuum
 hypothesis might be provable (or disprovable). Let us
 suppose that such a new system of axioms has been con-
 structed ; and let us suppose that in this new axiomatic
 system a formula which we say expresses the continuum
 hypothesis has been disproved. How should we interpret
 such a result ? It seems to me that in this case one would
 be presented with a new mathematical theory, different
 from the existing set theory, and defining a new concept
 of " set." In this new theory all sorts of theorems which
 have no meaning in the existing theory might be provable.
 On the other hand, there would be a large number of
 analogies between the new theory and the present one, and
 it is in virtue of those analogies that we should call the new
 mathematical system a " new theory of sets." Now the
 fact that in such a new theory what I may call the " con-
 tinuum hypothesis formula " was disprovable, would not,
 so far as I can see, entitle us to say that Cantor's conjecture
 has been shown to be false ; for in the new theory the
 formula would have a different meaning. I realize that
 this will not convince Findlay since he seems to think that
 a mathematical formula has a well-determined meaning
 quite independently of any calculus to which it belongs,
 and that in fact the problem of the continuum is logically
 capable of solution by " intuition." As I have already
 pointed out, however, he has given no arguments for his
 views ; and if I am right in what I have said above, it
 follows that the supposition that one might " see at a glance "
 whether the continuum hypothesis is true or false, is devoid
 of meaning.
 7 Cf. K. G6del, " What is Cantor's Continuum Problem ? " The American
 Mathematical Monthly vol. 54 (1947), pp. 515-525. Cf. also K. G6del, " Russell's
 Mathematical Logic," The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell ed. by P. A. Schilpp
 (Evanston and Chicago, 1944), pp. 125-153.
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 Hardy and Godel talk of a "mathematical reality "
 which mathematical theorems "describe," and seem to
 infer from this that a mathematical theorem must be true
 or false even if it is undecidable in any existing calculus.
 But is this an inference ? Does the claim that there is a
 mathematical reality which is described by mathematical
 theorems amount to anything more than the claim that
 every well-formed mathematical sentence must express
 something true or false ? So far as I can see, one is adding
 nothing to the latter claim, and one is not justifying it, by
 bringing in the reference to a " mathematical reality." And I
 can see no good reason for supposing the claim to be true.
 At this point, however, there is a danger of confusion.
 I am not maintaining that a mathematical formula cannot
 be said to express something true or false merely because
 it has not, as a matter of fact, been proved or disproved :
 I am talking only of undecidable formulas. It seems to
 me incorrect to suppose that just because a formula has
 not yet been proved (or disproved), it does not express
 something true or false, and that it only comes to do so
 when someone happens to prove it (or to disprove it).
 But the case of undecidable formulas is different. For in
 the former case by asking whether the formula expresses
 something true or false, I am asking whether it is provable
 or disprovable in a certain mathematical system. This I
 cannot, ex hypothesi, be asking in the latter case ; and there
 is no clear meaning I can attach to the question. Now, the
 following objection may be made to this view. It may be
 said that in order to show that a formula is undecidable
 one must first understand it, and hence that it must have
 meaning; and that it cannot cease to have meaning by
 being proved to be undecidable. I do not see, however,
 that the reference to " meaning " and " understanding "
 is helpful in this connexion. Of course, there is a sense in
 which I understand an undecidable mathematical formula,
 and in which I do not understand a collection of nonsense
 words. But from the fact that I understand it in some sense,
 it does not seem to me to follow that the formula has
 meaning in the sense of expressing something true or false.
 E2
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 III.
 There is another point arising out of Findlay's paper
 which has puzzled me a good deal, and which I should
 like to mention. By claiming that there is no logical
 impossibility in the supposition that one's " non-counting,
 non-successive apprehension of number" should be so
 extended that one would recognize at a glance the presence
 of Cantor's " first simple infinity," Findlay clearly implies
 that there is no logical impossibility in the supposition that
 one should be able to see at a glance whether, for instance,
 a sheet of paper in front of one contains a million and
 eleven dots or a million and twelve. For if the latter
 supposition is logically impossible, it seems to follow that
 the former is also logically impossible. (Although, of
 course, the latter supposition may be logically possible
 without the former being logically possible.) But is it
 logically possible that one should see at a glance whether
 there are a million and eleven dots on a sheet of paper or
 a million and twelve? Let us imagine that whenever
 Findlay says, just after glancing on a sheet of paper, " There
 are a million and eleven dots here," and we then count
 the dots, we find him to be right. We might naturally
 describe the situation by saying " Findlay can recognize at
 a glance the presence of a million and eleven dots." If by
 saying that it is logically possible that a man's non-counting,
 non-successive discrimination of number should be extended
 up to a million, or two million, one means that we can
 imagine cases, like the one given above, which we might
 naturally describe by using some such words, then the
 supposition is logically possible. But is this what Findlay
 means ? I hardly think so for such cases could also be
 described by saying that a man always guesses correctly the
 number of dots which he sees, say up to two million.
 Findlay would probably say that what he means is that it
 is logically possible for a man to recognize at a glance the
 presence of a million and eleven dots in the same way in
 which one normally recognizes at a glance the presence of
 three dots. But what exactly does the expression " in the
 same way " mean ?
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 I PROPOSE to divide my contribution into two parts.
 In part I, I shall, within the limits set by the previous
 papers, sketch my own view on the topic of this symposium.
 In part II, I shall deal specifically with the points made by
 Professor Findlay and Dr. Lewy. By proceeding in this
 manner I hope to do justice to their arguments without
 undue repetition and to avoid the appearance of deliberate
 quibbling. It would be practically impossible to treat of
 all the issues raised by my predecessors in the discusssion
 and I have therefore selected those on which their disagree-
 ment seems strongest.
 I.
 1. Some necessary preliminaries.-To clarify the role of a
 term (a statement-part which itself neither is nor contains
 a statement) is to exhibit more or less completely its logical
 content, i.e., the deducibility-relations, if any, which it
 bears to other terms ; its range of applicability or reference,
 i.e., the particulars, if any, to which it refers ; and, lastly,
 its interconnection with other terms, i.e., the relations
 other than logical deducibility which it bears to them. The
 distinction between the logical content, the reference, and
 the interconnection of terms is in one form or another
 generally recognised and is at any rate easily understood.
 It is clear that every term has all sorts of interconnections
 with other terms and that not all of them are of equal
 philosophical interest. It is similarly clear that predicates
 are the only terms which have logical content. To prepare
 the ground for our main undertaking it will be useful to
 consider briefly and quite generally first the differences in
 the applicability to their instances, between empirical and
 non-empirical predicates ; and secondly a fairly frequent
 type of interconnection of empirical and non-empirical
 predicates
 With regard to some predicates it is logically possible
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 that they should apply to particulars which are located in
 time or space or both and are accessible to perception.
 I shall call such predicates, the particulars to which they
 apply, and the reference of the former to the latter
 " empirical." The best examples of empirical predicates
 are ostensively definable or, briefly, ostensive predicates:
 for to give an ostensive definition is to indicate empirical
 particulars.
 Although non-empirical predicates such as "mathe-
 matical point " or " mathematical circle " do not refer to
 empirical particulars, they may nevertheless by postulation
 be provided with a non-empirical reference. A reason for
 doing this may, for example, be a need to speak not only
 of intersecting physical circles but also of intersecting
 mathematical circles. It is important to notice that the
 reference of " mathematical circle " or any non-empirical
 predicate, unlike the reference of " physical circle" or any
 empirical predicate, is a part of its logical content. In other
 words, whether " being a mathematical circle" does or
 does not have a reference depends on whether it entails or
 does not entail " having a reference " (to non-empirical
 or postulated particulars of some more or less specified
 sort).
 An empirical and a non-empirical predicate, while
 differing fundamentally in their reference, may yet be
 similar enough in their logical content to permit their
 being used interchangeably in certain contexts. The
 predicates " physical circle " and " mathematical circle "
 are a case in point. Even without going more deeply into
 the nature of their resemblance we find that the two
 predicates have a closely similar logical content owing to
 which the results of reasoning involving " mathematical
 circle " can often profitably be used in the characterisation
 of physical circles. We might describe this interconnection
 between the two predicates by saying that the predicate
 " mathematical circle," although without empirical refer-
 ence, nevertheless applies, as it were, by proxy or via the
 predicate " physical circle " to empirical particulars and
 thus acquires a quasi-empirical reference,
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 It is easy to confuse (i) empirical reference (e.g., of
 "physical circle" to empirical particulars) with (ii) non-
 empirical reference (e.g., of " mathematical circle" to
 postulated particulars) or with (iii) quasi-empirical reference
 (e.g., of " mathematical circle" via " physical circle " to
 empirical particulars). To the clarification of the notion
 of infinity these confusions are fatal.
 2. Empirical and non-empirical aggregates and natural num-
 bers.-The words " one thing," " couple," " triad," etc.,
 are often used as empirical predicates, i.e., as referring
 directly to what is or can be perceived in space or time.
 Indeed what is meant by these empirical aggregate-
 notions can, and perhaps must, be explained with the
 help of ostensive definitions. The same is true of the
 notions of adding one empirical aggregate to another
 and of the resulting emergence of a new such aggre-
 gate.
 It is necessary to distinguish between empirical and
 non-empirical aggregate-notions. In order to do this we
 note the following two points about the empirical aggregate-
 notions. First, their reference, like that of all empirical
 predicates, is imprecise in the sense that with respect to
 some particulars we may not be able to decide whether or
 not they are instances of a certain empirical aggregate-
 notion. For example the rules governing " couple " and
 " triad" in their empirical use, or the rules governing, as
 I shall say, " empirical couple" and "empirical triad,"
 may not permit us to decide whether something we happen
 to perceive on a wet window-pane is an empirical couple
 or an empirical triad. The rules may indeed permit us
 to say quite properly that it is rather more of a couple
 than of a triad. This has the corollary that we cannot
 properly speak of the notion of an empirical aggregate as
 having an extension. When logicians and mathematicians
 speak of the extension of a predicate they imply that
 everything quite unambiguously either is or is not charac-
 terised by the predicate. In this fundamental sense of
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 "extension" empirical predicates and therefore empirical
 aggregate-notions have an empirical reference but have no
 extension.
 The second point concerns the logical content of empirical
 aggregate-notions and may be made by means of an
 example. If we observe the physical addition of an
 empirical triad to an empirical couple, an empirical quintet
 may, but does not necessarily, emerge. In other words,
 " being the immediate result of the physical addition of an
 empirical triad to an empirical couple " does not entail
 " being the emergence of an empirical quintet" but
 overlaps with it.
 Now, it is for many purposes convenient to ignore the
 overlapping cases and even to define new notions of
 couple, triad, etc., which are like the empirical ones except
 that, e.g., " being the result of the addition of a triad to a
 couple " does not overlap with but entails " being the
 emergence of a quintet." More generally while the successive
 physical addition of an empirical unit to an empirical unit
 does not necessarily yield the sequence " empirical unit,"
 " empirical couple," etc., but may be full of surprises, we
 can through modifying the logical content of these predicates
 arrive at the well-behaved sequence " non-empirical unit,"
 " non-empirical couple," etc. (where the meaning of" etc."
 is not yet clearly determined). By modifying the logical
 content of empirical aggregate-notions in this manner we
 define non-empirical aggregate-notions which, roughly
 speaking, are idealisations of the empirical ones but as
 such have lost their empirical reference. " Being the
 successor of a non-empirical couple " entails " being a
 non-empirical triad," but does not refer to what we perceive
 on window-panes or anywhere else.
 Whether our non-empirical aggregate-notions already
 deserve the name of number-predicates or whether for that
 purpose further changes in their logical content are neces-
 sary, is a question of little importance. We shall be
 approaching more closely to the notion of natural number
 if we provide the non-empirical aggregate-notions, by
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 postulation, with a non-empirical reference. This, as we
 have seen (section 1) again involves only a change of
 logical content. More precisely, we replace "non-
 empirical couple," etc., which so far do not entail " having
 a non-empirical reference" by otherwise similar predicates
 for which this entailment does hold
 The non-empirical reference of, e.g., " non-empirical
 couple " may, of course, be specified in many ways. We
 may in particular postulate that the non-empirical par-
 ticulars to which the predicate refers are in some way
 distinguishable or that they are not distinguishable. In
 the latter case the predicate would refer to a single indi-
 vidual. (This follows from the principle of the identity of
 indiscernibles which for non-empirical particulars is, I
 believe, generally accepted.)
 3. On the infinite totality of natural numbers.-The non-
 empirical aggregate-notions and the notion of natural
 number are thus not abstractions from experience, as are
 the notions of a green patch or a physical circle. They
 are idealisations of experience or, more precisely, the
 result of modifying the logical content of empirical predi-
 cates. They are not " made by God " but " the work of
 man." If it is a sin to transcend experience by the use of
 non-empirical predicates then it has already been committed
 by postulating that aggregate-notions have a precise ref-
 erence and that the sequence generated by the successive
 addition of units be free of surprises. Objections against
 further modifications in the logical content of number-
 predicates on the ground that they are thereby deprived
 of their intuitively clear reference can thus have little force.
 This is in particular true of objections to the introduction of
 various notions of infinity into mathematics.
 The statement that physical addition of an empirical
 couple to an empirical triad yields a physical quintet is
 an empirical statement. So are the statement that the
 process of forming successively greater physical aggregates
 by successive physical addition can be completed, and the
 statement that this process cannot be completed. (e.g.,
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 because we have not " world enough, and time " or because
 some more elaborate physical theory happens to be true).
 It follows that the statement to the effect that the process
 is incompletable and that it is completed is an internMlly
 inconsistent conjunction of two incompatible empirical
 statements.
 On the other hand, in speaking of a successive non-
 empirical addition of non-empirical aggregates, of the
 completability and completion of this process we are no
 longer making empirical statements. We are using the
 words " successive," "completable," "completed " meta-
 phorically for non-empirical predicates. Indeed, the succes-
 sive addition of a non-empirical unit to a non-empirical
 unit takes no time or does not take place in time since only
 empirical particulars are located in time. The generation
 of the sequence of natural numbers by successive addition
 may thus be both incompletable in the sense that no natural
 number is the greatest and yet in some other sense of the
 term complete. Whether or not this is so depends on the
 logical content and in particular on the non-empirical
 reference of " natural number."
 By postulating different kinds of non-empirical reference
 we may endow the words " actually and completely given
 infinite extension of' natural number'" with different and
 precise meanings. Thus we may postulate that " natural
 number" has an infinite and complete extension in the
 sense that with respect to every (or almost every) property
 any natural number either does or does not possess it. We
 may, moreover, postulate that with the set of all natural
 numbers the set of all its sub-sets is given ; and even that
 the last-mentioned set can be well ordered. Such postula-
 tions, their logical consequences and mutual compatibility
 are the proper concern of mathematicians. Although the
 philosopher has to deal with different questions concerning
 number and infinity he does well to remember that in
 defining " natural number " as having one or another kind
 of infinite extension one modifies the logical content not of
 an empirical predicate but of a non-empirical one.
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 4. Non-empirical continua and other notions of infinity.-
 Other notions of infinity which occur within and outside
 mathematics can be tackled on the lines of the preceding
 discussion: we compare the non-empirical predicates
 having infinite extensions with empirical predicates of
 which they are idealisations and consider the nature of their
 postulated reference. If, as is convenient but not essential,
 we compare these predicates in terms of a step-by-step
 modification of logical content, then we must note that
 different routes leading from empirical predicates to their
 non-empirical counterparts are possible.
 In order to clarify the notion of a line consisting of an
 infinite number of points we must distinguish between an
 empirical and a non-empirical notion of line. The
 distinction need not be worked out in any detail. It is
 analogous to that between empirical and non-empirical
 aggregate-notions and almost generally accepted.
 To speak of a successive physical division of an empirical
 line as both incompletable and complete is to be guilty of
 a contradiction in terms. The division of a non-empirical
 line may, however, in a metaphorical sense of the terms,
 be both incompletable and complete. Whether or not this
 is so depends on the logical content of " non-empirical
 line," " non-empirical division," etc., and in particular on
 the sort of extension which is postulated for those predicates.
 In this context it may be worth pointing out that Brouwer's
 " incompletable set of parts of a continuous line" as a
 " medium of free becoming " is not an empirical predicate
 but at best a less radical idealisation than the notion of a
 line according to the classical theory of sets. It is not
 necessary here to consider the relations between various
 conceptions of natural number on the one hand and of the
 mathematical continuum on the other.
 The notions of the infinitely small, the infinitely large, of
 infinite space, time or power have not yet received as
 subtle and complex an elaboration as the set-theoretical
 notions of infinity. They too are non-empirical predicates
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 which are the result of modifying the logical content of
 empirical ones and do not from that point of view present
 any essentially new features.
 5. Questions of existence.-A predicate which refers to
 empirical particulars is necessarily self-consistent. The
 internal consistency of non-empirical predicates must be
 shown in other ways. For some non-empirical predicates,
 which include predicates with infinite extensions, this has
 been recognised by Kant and Hilbert. The former
 attempted consistency proofs in order " to make room for
 faith " in certain moral and religious beliefs, the latter in
 order to make room for faith in classical mathematics.
 If a mathematician asks whether an infinity, say the
 infinite extension of "natural number," exists he is, as a
 rule, merely asking whether this predicate, which inter alia
 entails " having an infinite extension " (of a certain kind),
 is internally consistent, and consistent with other predicates.
 If a philosopher asks this question he is rarely, if ever,
 concerned merely with questions of consistency. At the
 very least he will also wish to know whether the actual use
 of the notion of natural number by a group of thinkers,
 especially of mathematicians, does in fact involve the
 postulation of an infinite extension of one kind or another
 and perhaps whether such postulation is from the point of
 view of a specific metaphysical outlook required or per-
 mitted.
 However, the heart of this philosophical existence
 problem is the question how the predicate " natural
 number," or any other non-empirical predicate with an
 infinite extension, is characteristic of or related to empirical
 fact. This very old philosophical question is answered
 neither by the true statement that " natural number" has
 no empirical reference nor by the equally true statement
 that it refers by definition to non-empirical particulars. It
 is answered only by showing, on the lines which I have
 indicated, in which respects the non-empirical predicate is
 a modification of an empirical one and how in consequence
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 of this relation the two predicates can in many contexts be
 used interchangeably. In other words the answer
 consists in explaining the quasi-empirical reference of non-
 empirical aggregate-notions via empirical ones to instances
 of the latter.
 II.
 1. The bearers of natural numbers.-While I agree with
 Professor Findlay and Dr. Lewy that the question as to the
 kind of entities, if any, to which natural numbers apply is
 highly relevant to our subject, I cannot agree with the
 answers which they propose.
 According to Findlay natural numbers apply to what
 he calls " things in the plural" and contrasts both with
 Russell's classes and Frege's concepts. It is one of his
 principal contentions that the bearers of natural numbers
 may, but need not, be accessible to perception. This view
 seems to me mistaken and based on the failure to distinguish
 between empirical aggregate-notions which have perceiv-
 able instances and non-empirical aggregate-notions which
 cannot have such instances. The difference between, say,
 " empirical couple" and " non-empirical couple " is, we
 have seen, analogous to that between " physical circle "
 and " geometrical circle." To replace the empirical by
 the non-empirical predicate is in both cases to pay for the
 achievement of precision with the loss of empirical
 reference.
 It is strange that philosophers who would never confuse
 the notions of empirical and geometrical figures do not
 hesitate to confuse the notions of empirical and non-
 empirical aggregates. Yet Peano's rules for the logical
 behaviour of natural numbers are as remote from the rules
 governing empirical aggregate-notions as are Euclid's rules
 for the logical behaviour of geometical predicates from the
 rules governing the notions of perceivable shapes.
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 If the distinction between empirical and non-empirical
 aggregate-notions is justified, then Findlay should hold not
 that natural numbers may but need not apply to what can
 be perceived, but that empirical aggregate-notions do apply
 to perceivable instances and that non-empirical aggregate-
 notions, including the various notions of natural number,
 do not. His emphatic insistence that we sometimes perceive,
 say, a couple of things as a couple, without judging its
 elements to fall under a common concept, seems to me
 justified and important if the word " couple " is used in
 the sense of" empirical couple."
 Lewy, like Findlay, does not distinguish between
 empirical and non-empirical aggregate-notions. His thesis
 that a physical collection or anything perceivable cannot
 be the bearer of a number can, therefore, be accepted only
 with the qualification that it concerns non-empirical
 aggregate-notions. He adopts Frege's doctrine that num-
 bers apply to concepts and Frege's argument that unless
 numerical statements contained assertions about concepts
 we could not explain why we can truly attribute different
 numbers to the same external phenomenon ; e.g., by saying
 with respect to what we see with equal truth " Here is one
 copse" and " Here are five trees." I do not find
 this argument at all convincing and believe that one
 can reject Frege's theory and yet provide the required
 explanation.
 We often truly attribute different numbers to the same
 external phenomenon in the sense that we judge it to be
 an instance of different empirical aggregate-notions. This
 it may be, for at least two reasons. First, the same external
 phenomenon can be perceived in different groupings and
 the possibility of its being so perceived does not or, at least,
 does not necessarily depend on a preliminary application
 to it of a concept. The application of a concept, say,
 " copse " or " tree," may merely serve the purpose of
 identifying, for others or even the percipient, one of the
 many perceptually different groupings of the same external
 phenomenon. If, however, the application of " copse "
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 or " tree " serves only to identify a grouping then it is the
 identified grouping and not the identifying concept which
 is an empirical unit or quintet.
 It is, secondly, quite possible that even after we have
 identified a perceptual grouping, say of clouds in the sky,
 as clearly as we can wish, it may be an instance of different
 empirical aggregate-notions. A clearly identified grouping
 may be an empirical couple and an empirical triad in exactly
 the same sense in which a clearly identified shape may be
 both an instance of " physical circle" and of "physical
 ellipse." That the overlap between the notions of physical
 shapes has nothing to do with an insufficiently sharp
 identification of their bearers was made painfully clear to
 some of Pavlov's dogs ; and if not to the dogs then at least
 to the experimenters. Its root lies in the imprecise
 reference which is characteristic of all empirical notions
 including those of empirical aggregates. It is not
 characteristic of non-empirical aggregate-notions because
 these apply neither to empirical particulars nor to con-
 cepts whose instances are such particulars but only to
 postulated particulars whose nature is a matter of
 definition.
 I have argued that no account of numerical statements
 can be successful which ignores the distinction between
 empirical and non-empirical aggregate-notions. It is just
 possible that exception might be taken to this contention
 on the ground that the distinction is not made in ordinary
 talk. It might be pointed out that we say there are five
 persons in a room without indicating that we are speaking
 of an empirical quintet. The statement is, however,
 ambiguous and its meaning depends on its context. It
 may merely refer to an empirical quintet ; but it may, as,
 e.g., in the context of a statistical enquiry, express the
 speaker's intention to replace the predicate by a non-empir-
 ical one which is governed by altogether different rules. An
 analogous ambiguity attaches to the statement that there
 is a circle on the black-board.
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 2. The actual versus the potential infinite.-I am not fully
 satisfied with Professor Findlay's spirited defence of the
 notion of actual infinity. My main difficulty concerns the
 sense in which in his view the notion of, say, natural
 number refers to an infinite set of objects. In some passages
 he seems to imply that the reference is not wholly a matter
 of definition and postulation. If, as he says, a super-human
 being " could . . . recognise at a glance the presence of
 that first simple infinity" then this being's report on its
 perceptions might tell us something about the reference of
 " natural number " which does not follow from considering
 its logical content.
 In other passages, which on the whole seem more impor-
 tant to me, he implies that our question can be fully answered
 by considering the logical content of " natural number."
 He says, " the only sense in which the existence of infinite
 numbers can be philosophically significant, is the sense in
 which it is logically possible for things to be infinitely
 numerous. .. ." He holds that a finite or transfinite number
 is a kind of thing whose existence therefore " will consist
 in the logically possible existence of its instances." To
 state, however, with regard to a predicate that the existence
 of its instances is logically possible is to state no more than
 that the predicate is internally consistent. Once this
 question is answered by considering the logical content of
 the predicate there remains nothing to be discovered by
 any being with whatever powers of perception.
 I have argued that "natural number" is a non-
 empirical predicate and that, therefore, in speaking about
 its (non-empirical) reference we are exhibiting its logical
 content. If this is so then we can without inconsistency
 adopt and use two different predicates : " natural number,"
 and " natural number2" of which the first but not also the
 second entails "referring to an actual and complete
 infinity." There is no need to choose between them or
 defend one against the other, but only not to confuse them.
 As Lewy emphasises, the " completeness " of an infinite
 set differs from that of a finite set ; and, I may add, both
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 these senses differ from the sense in which an empirical
 aggregate, such as a group of five trees, can be perceived
 as complete. The completeness of the infinite set of natural
 numbers has been defined in different ways, e.g., by postu-
 lating that the set of all its sub-sets can be well ordered or
 by making some weaker postulation.
 Since the notion of natural number is in any case non-
 empirical we cannot by referring to a direct object of
 intuition or to the possibility of such intuition explain the
 meaning of " actual and complete set of natural numbers "
 or prove that " the infinite is not a name for a rule but
 exists as something actual and complete." I agree with
 Lewy that any attempt to do this must fail, but I do not
 think, as he does, that such an attempt constitutes the core
 of Findlay's paper. In spite of some impressions to the
 contrary Findlay means, I believe, by " the existence of a
 transfinite number," by " the logically possible existence of
 the instances of a transfinite number " and lastly by " the
 logical possibility of a direct apprehension of an instance
 of a transfinite number" no more than the internal con-
 sistency of a predicate " transfinite number " as defined by
 postulates.
 In that case, however, his somewhat light-hearted dis-
 missal of " supposed " contradictions in Cantor's theory is
 difficult to understand. One would like to know whether
 he thinks that no antinomies (such as the Russell paradox
 for example) arise within the classical theory of sets ; or
 whether he thinks that they can be removed from the theory
 without seriously affecting its structure. This is not idle
 curiosity : for whoever wishes to justify the use of a notion
 of actual infinity or save it from being blurred or obscured
 by other notions must assume that it is internally consistent.
 3. The reality of infinite extensions.-Findlay claims for his
 account of finite and transfinite numbers as kinds or sorts
 of things that it is not " bound up with the actual contents
 of our world " and that it yet " never loses its ultimate
 touch with ordinary things (whether actual or possible)."
 F
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 Thus the kind " being a couple " happens to have actual
 instances, while the kinds " being of number n," where n
 is very large, and " being infinitely numerous " may for
 all we know have no actual instance. Nevertheless, we can
 significantly talk about all these kinds. I have rejected this
 view on the ground that it confuses the essentially different
 notions of empirical and non-empirical aggregates.
 Lewy in his contribution criticises the belief in a special
 mathematical reality because he thinks that it lies at the
 back of Findlay's paper. Although I am not at all sure
 about this I shall nevertheless briefly consider Lewy's
 criticism. He holds that to assume a mathematical reality
 implies the belief that every well-formed mathematical
 formula expresses a true or false proposition. Since against
 the latter belief serious objections can be raised which are
 connected with the undecidability of some formulae, Lewy
 argues that the same objections also discredit the assumption
 of a mathematical reality.
 I am not convinced by Lewy's argument, because the
 two positions seem to me logically independent. A person
 may hold that every mathematical proposition is true or
 false but that no true mathematical proposition is true of
 anything, arguing, e.g., that it is a true (bilateral) hypo-
 thetical proposition without existential import. Such a
 person would not believe in any special mathematical
 reality. On the other hand a person does believe in a
 special mathematical reality if he believes that some mathe-
 matical propositions are true of particulars sui generis which
 are neither empirical nor postulated. This belief, however,
 will not commit him to believing that every well-formed
 formula expresses a true or false proposition. The real
 difficulty about the doctrine of a special mathematical
 reality lies in the obscure nature of the particulars of which,
 it asks us to suppose, some mathematical statements are
 true.
 The considerations which militate against the doctrine
 of a special mathematical reality seem to favour Russell's
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 account of finite and transfinite numbers. According to
 this account, quite roughly speaking, every number is a
 class of classes ; and every class consists either immediately
 or mediately (through the hierarchy of types) of empirical
 particulars. This doctrine must be rejected if only for the
 absurd consequences which Findlay has shown to flow
 from it.
 All the theories which I have so far mentioned in the
 present section are monistic in the sense that they do not
 recognise the difference between empirical and non-
 empirical aggregate-notions. A dualistic theory which does
 recognise this difference has been developed by Plato but
 gives rise to insuperable difficulties. These are mainly
 connected with the thesis that the mathematical Forms,
 among others, describe or constitute a special non-empirical
 reality; with the distinction between the mathematical
 Forms and their instances (r t.aOtpa8lar'cd) ; and, most important of all, with the nature of the relation (pte'8Oeft)
 of empirical aggregates to the mathematical Forms.
 None of these difficulties arises in the dualistic theory
 which I have outlined in part I. The non-empirical
 aggregate-notions do not describe anything, but are merely
 modifications of the logical content of empirical aggregate-
 notions. The nature of their instances is determined by
 postulations and forms part of their logical content. Lastly,
 the connection between non-empirical aggregate-notions
 (with or without infinite extensions) on the one hand, and
 empirical aggregates on the other, consists in what I have
 called the quasi-empirical reference of the former to the
 latter.
 In the beginning of his contribution Findlay suggests
 that " the only real questions " connected with the infinite
 " may be those concerning its precise implications and
 possible applications". This assumption does not, I think,
 bear close examination. On the one hand it misleadingly
 suggests an opposition between exhibiting the logical
 content and exhibiting the possible applicability of non-
 F2
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 empirical aggregate-notions whereas, as we have seen, the
 latter activity is included in the former. On the other hand
 it ignores the problem of the non-deductive interconnection
 between non-empirical aggregate-notions and empirical
 ones, and consequently the eminently philosophical problem
 of the relation between mathematical theory and empirical
 fact.
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